Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Equality and Partiality'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]