Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', 'The Journals of Kierkegaard' and 'Consciousness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]