28 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |