Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types', 'Mechanisms' and 'The Inessential Indexical'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
18405 A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17488 Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17493 Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
17487 Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17489 Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17490 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
17491 Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
18422 Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
18425 We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
18421 Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417 Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408 Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
18414 Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
18423 All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406 The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
18411 It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
18420 We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
17494 Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]