16 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |