24 ideas
5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |