14 ideas
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |