15 ideas
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
| 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
| 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
| 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
| 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
| 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |