12 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
| 3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
| 12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
| 18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
| 15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
| 15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |