Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth by Convention', 'The Psychophysical Nexus' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]