14 ideas
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
13342 | Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
13251 | Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |