Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'On Sensations (frags)' and 'Difference and Repetition'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
16943 Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
21901 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16949 Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
21908 Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
21902 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
21903 Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
21904 Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
2975 That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
16944 Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16941 Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
16940 Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
16934 General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
16938 To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
16947 Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
7375 Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
16935 If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
16936 Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
16937 You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
16942 It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]