12 ideas
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |
| 2856 | Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B] |