11 ideas
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
21338 | I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |