40 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |