17 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |