11 ideas
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |