Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Carnap and Logical Truth' and 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]