Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Individuation of Attributes', 'Natural Kinds' and 'Some Models for Implicature'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]