17 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |