14 ideas
| 21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 16698 | Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley] |
| 16690 | Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |