37 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |