14 ideas
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 18424 | If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |