Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Logic', 'Unpublished Writings 1872-74' and 'Consciousness Explained'

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99 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche]
The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche]
Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD]
Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD]
Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD]
We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD]
A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD]
A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD]
Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD]
Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD]
Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD]
There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD]
The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche]
The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche]
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche]