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All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Logic', 'Amphitheatrum' and 'Eudemian Ethics'

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD]
Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD]
Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD]
We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD]
A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD]
A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD]
Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD]
Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD]
Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD]
There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD]
The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing but its parts [Vanini]