77 ideas
13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |