71 ideas
| 13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
| 13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
| 13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
| 13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
| 13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
| 13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
| 13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
| 13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
| 13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
| 13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
| 13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
| 13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
| 13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
| 13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
| 13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
| 13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
| 13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
| 13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
| 13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
| 13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
| 13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
| 13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
| 13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
| 13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
| 13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
| 13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
| 13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
| 13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
| 13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
| 13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
| 13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
| 13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
| 13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
| 13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
| 13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
| 13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
| 13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
| 13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
| 13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
| 13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
| 13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
| 13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
| 13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
| 13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
| 13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |