Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Logic', 'Sententia on 'De Caelo'' and 'Consciousness: matter becomes imagination'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD]
Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD]
Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD]
We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD]
A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD]
A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD]
Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD]
Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD]
Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD]
There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD]
The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Prior to language, concepts are universals created by self-mapping of brain activity [Edelman/Tononi]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Cultures have a common core of colour naming, based on three axes of colour pairs [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A sense of self begins either internally, or externally through language and society [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Brains can initiate free actions before the person is aware of their own decision [Edelman/Tononi]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Brain complexity balances segregation and integration, like a good team of specialists [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts and generalisations result from brain 'global mapping' by 'reentry' [Edelman/Tononi, by Searle]
Concepts arise when the brain maps its own activities [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi]