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All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Logic', 'fragments/reports' and 'Categories'

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92 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD]
Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD]
Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD]
We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD]
A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD]
A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD]
Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD]
Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD]
Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD]
There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD]
The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]
Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]