16 ideas
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
6587 | It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |