48 ideas
2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle] |
2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle] |
2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |