Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Consciousness', 'How to Define Theoretical Terms' and 'A Free Will'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / e. Late classical philosophy
In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M]
In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M]
The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M]
The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M]