Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Consciousness', 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' and 'works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


43 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx]
False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer]
Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx]
Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil]
Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie]
Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]