98 ideas
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
14562 | A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14541 | Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
14553 | Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum] |
14538 | Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum] |
14555 | Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum] |
14557 | Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14583 | Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum] |
14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
14584 | The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum] |
14582 | Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14542 | If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum] |
14535 | Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14561 | Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum] |
14579 | Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum] |
14580 | Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum] |
14552 | Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum] |
14578 | Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum] |
14549 | Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
14585 | We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum] |
17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
14576 | Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum] |
17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
14551 | If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum] |
14571 | The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum] |
14570 | Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
14569 | It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum] |
14568 | A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum] |
17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
14556 | Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
14566 | Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum] |
14577 | Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14563 | Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14587 | We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum] |
14533 | Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum] |
14558 | A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum] |
14559 | Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14565 | Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum] |
14567 | Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum] |
14537 | Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum] |
14572 | Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14573 | Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum] |
14574 | Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum] |
14539 | Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14550 | We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14546 | Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum] |
14575 | A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum] |
17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
14548 | There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum] |
14554 | Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14564 | If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum] |
17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |
17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |
17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |