35 ideas
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
| 15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |