Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds', '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics' and 'Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]