Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Consciousness', 'Principia Mathematica' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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83 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton]
Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz]
We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P]
1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton]
2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton]
3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton]
Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton]
Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton]
I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton]
The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin]
Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon]
Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton]
Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton]