Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Consciousness', 'In a Critical Condition' and 'Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn)'

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka]
Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka]
Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka]
Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka]
Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka]
The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka]
Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka]
The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka]
Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka]
'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka]
Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka]
Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka]
Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]