80 ideas
| 8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
| 8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
| 8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
| 8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
| 8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
| 8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
| 8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
| 8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
| 8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |