Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Consciousness', 'The Powers Metaphysics' and 'Symbolic Reasoning'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null class is the class with all the non-existents as its members [MacColl, by Lackey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE]
A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE]
Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE]
Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE]
Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE]
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]