32 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
4988 | Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM] |
4987 | Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |