18 ideas
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |