55 ideas
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| 8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
| 8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
| 18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
| 8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
| 8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
| 8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
| 8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
| 8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
| 8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
| 8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
| 8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
| 8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
| 8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
| 8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
| 20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
| 8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
| 20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
| 20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
| 20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
| 20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
| 20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
| 20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
| 20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
| 20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
| 20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
| 20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
| 20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
| 20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |