98 ideas
| 12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
| 12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
| 12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
| 12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
| 19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| 12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
| 12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
| 15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
| 12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
| 15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
| 15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
| 15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
| 15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
| 15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
| 15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
| 13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
| 15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
| 15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
| 12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
| 12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
| 12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
| 12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
| 12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
| 12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
| 12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
| 15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
| 12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
| 12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
| 15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
| 12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
| 12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
| 11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
| 12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
| 19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
| 15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
| 15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
| 15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
| 15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
| 5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
| 15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
| 12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
| 5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
| 5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
| 15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
| 15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
| 15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
| 15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
| 5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
| 12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
| 15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
| 12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
| 12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
| 15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
| 12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
| 15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |
| 12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
| 12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
| 5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
| 12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
| 12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
| 12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |