Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds', 'Moral Luck' and 'The Rationality of Science'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
3869 More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
3861 Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
3867 De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3872 We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3271 We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3857 Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
3272 Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]