79 ideas
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
| 14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
| 7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
| 7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
| 7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
| 7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
| 7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
| 7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
| 7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
| 7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
| 7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
| 7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
| 7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
| 7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
| 7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
| 7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
| 7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
| 7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
| 7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
| 20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
| 7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |