Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Approaches to Intentionality', 'Introduction to German Philosophy' and 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thinking has content [Lyons]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie]