14 ideas
| 18469 | God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B] |
| 15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
| 15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
| 15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
| 15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
| 15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
| 15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| 15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |