21 ideas
| 14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
| 14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
| 14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
| 14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
| 14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
| 14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
| 14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
| 14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| 14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
| 22594 | In 1794 France all individual and legal rights were suppressed by the general will [Dunt] |
| 22602 | Over several centuries a set of eight main liberal values was established [Dunt] |
| 22596 | No government, or the whole nation, can control an individual beyond legitimate scope [Dunt] |
| 22603 | Laissez-faire liberalism failed to give people the protections and freedoms needed for a good life [Dunt] |
| 22592 | Nationalism pretends that we can only have a single identity [Dunt] |
| 14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |