29 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |